ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
PalestineAssessedHamas-affiliatedMixedActive 2018 – 2025

WIRTE

Also known asAshen Lepus · ALUMINUM THORN

Summary

Middle Eastern cyberespionage actor active since at least August 2018, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang (MITRE G0090) and tracked by Unit 42 as Ashen Lepus. It targets diplomatic, financial, military, legal and technology organisations across the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, chiefly Arabic-speaking government bodies, using spearphishing with geopolitical lures, DLL side-loading and loaders that hide payloads inside HTML tags on C2 pages. Check Point tracked a campaign from late 2023 using the IronWind loader and later Havoc against the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (targeting described as likely), and linked the group's custom malware to the SameCoin wiper used against Israeli entities in February and October 2024, including emails sent from a legitimate Israeli ESET reseller's address. In December 2025 Unit 42 described a new AshTag .NET malware suite, hands-on theft of diplomatic documents with Rclone, activity continuing after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, and expansion to entities in Oman and Morocco.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: Hamas-affiliated

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources

Campaigns 3

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
AshTag espionage against Arab government and diplomatic entities2025 – ongoingPalestine, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, MoroccoGovernment, DiplomaticPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2025-12-11)
SameCoin wiper attacks on Israeli entities2024-02 – 2024-10IsraelHealthcare, MunicipalCheck Point Research (2024-11-12)
IronWind / Havoc espionage — Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia2023-10 – 2024-09Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi ArabiaGovernmentCheck Point Research (2024-11-12)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 12

Resource Development2T1586.002Email AccountsT1608.001Upload Malware
Initial Access2T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1566.002Spearphishing Link
Stealth5T1684.001ImpersonationT1574.001DLLT1497.001System ChecksT1218.010Regsvr32T1027.015Compression
Collection2T1114.001Local Email CollectionT1074.001Local Data Staging
Command and Control1T1571Non-Standard Port

Malware and tools 8

NameDescriptionPlatform
AshTagModular .NET backdoor suite (AshenLoader, AshenStager, AshenOrchestrator)Windows
IronWindLoader (payloads hidden in HTML tags)Windows
SameCoinWiperWindows/Android
HavocC2 frameworkWindows
FerociousFirst-stage VBS/PowerShell implantWindows
LitePowerDownloader and second-stage malwareWindows
EmpirePost-exploitation frameworkWindows
RcloneExfiltration toolWindows

Infrastructure patterns

  • C2 answers only sample-specific user agents and checks location; redirects to news sites (Check Point, 2024; MITRE ATT&CK, 2026)
  • HTTPS C2 on ports 2083 and 2087; lookalike domains imitating security vendors (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026)

Reporting and advisories 3