ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
ChinaSuspectedChina-nexusEspionageActive 2021 – 2024

Velvet Ant

Summary

Espionage actor named by Sygnia (MITRE G1047), operating since at least 2021. Sygnia found it inside a large organisation for about three years, until late 2023, persisting through repeated eradication attempts. It moved from modern endpoints to legacy Windows Server 2003 hosts and to two internet-facing legacy F5 BIG-IP appliances, which it used as internal command-and-control. On the F5 devices it ran custom tools Sygnia names VELVETSTING (hourly command polling), VELVETTAP (packet capture) and ESRDE, made persistent through rc.local (T1037.004, T1040). On Windows it relied on PlugX loaded by DLL search-order hijacking (T1574.001) and installed as a service (T1569.002), routed some PlugX traffic through an internal file server (T1090.001), and tampered with EDR products (T1685). In July 2024 Sygnia disclosed that the group had exploited Cisco NX-OS CVE-2024-20399 as a zero-day: with valid switch-administrator credentials it escaped the NX-OS CLI to run code on Cisco Nexus switches (T1211, T1078.003). Cisco learned of exploitation attempts in April 2024. Sygnia assesses the actor as China-nexus and state-sponsored, citing target selection, network-device focus, a toolset that includes PlugX and ShadowPad, and DLL side-loading. It also says shared tooling among China-nexus intrusion sets prevents attribution to a known group and that a false flag cannot be ruled out, so the country is held at low confidence. Sygnia has not disclosed the victim.

Attribution

SuspectedSuspected link: China-nexus

Not tied to a known group; false flag not ruled out (Sygnia)

Hedged, circumstantial or press-only reporting; not established.

Sources
  • Sygnia (Research, 2024-06-03)
    Evidence suggests a China-nexus state-sponsored actor

Campaigns 2

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Cisco NX-OS CVE-2024-20399 zero-day exploitation on Nexus switches2024UndisclosedUndisclosedSygnia (2024-07-01); Cisco PSIRT (2024-07-01)
Multi-year espionage intrusion in a large organisation — legacy F5 BIG-IP appliances and Windows Server 2003 hosts used for persistence2021 – 2023UndisclosedUndisclosedSygnia (2024-06-03)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 10

Initial Access1T1078.003Local Accounts
Execution3T1574.001DLLT1569.002Service ExecutionT1047Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence1T1037.004RC Scripts
Stealth1T1211Exploitation for Stealth
Defense Impairment1T1685Disable or Modify Tools
Credential Access1T1040Network Sniffing
Command and Control2T1090.001Internal ProxyT1571Non-Standard Port

Malware and tools 5

NameDescriptionPlatform
VELVETSTINGBackdoor (polls C&C hourly for encoded commands)F5 BIG-IP (Linux)
VELVETTAPPacket-capture toolF5 BIG-IP (Linux)
ESRDEBackdoor (VELVETSTING-like)F5 BIG-IP (Linux)
PlugXModular backdoor (shared China-nexus)Windows
ShadowPadModular backdoor (shared China-nexus)Windows

Exploited vulnerabilities 1

CVECVSSDetail
CVE-2024-203996Cisco NX-OS Software CLI — command injection, 0-day (KEV 2024-07-02)

Highest CVSS first.

Infrastructure patterns

  • Internet-exposed legacy F5 BIG-IP appliances with a reverse SSH tunnel to its C&C (Sygnia, 2024)
  • PlugX re-pointed at an internal file server as C&C (port 13742) on legacy hosts (Sygnia, 2024)

Reporting and advisories 3