ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
IranAssessedMOIS-affiliatedEspionageActive 2019 – 2024

UNC1860

Also known asScarred Manticore · ShroudedSnooper · Storm-0861 · Arcane Kitten

Summary

Iranian state-sponsored intrusion group that Mandiant assesses is likely affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), specialising in passive backdoors on internet-facing Windows servers and in holding long-term access to government and telecommunications networks across the Middle East. CrowdStrike tracks the same adversary as ARCANE KITTEN and lists Scarred Manticore (Check Point), ShroudedSnooper (Cisco Talos), Storm-0861 (Microsoft) and UNC1860 (Mandiant) as its names. Mandiant describes it as a probable initial-access provider: GUI-operated controllers (TEMPLEPLAY, VIROGREEN) let a separate team operate its implants, victims of suspected APT34 were compromised by UNC1860 before or after, and its STAYSHANTE web shell and SASHEYAWAY dropper were indicators in the March 2024 wiper attacks on Israeli organisations. Check Point and MITRE (G1055) report collaboration with VOID MANTICORE, whose Homeland Justice and Karma operations it preceded; Mandiant could not independently corroborate its role in the 2022 Albania and 2023 Israel destructive attacks. Signature tradecraft is abuse of the Windows HTTP.sys driver to receive commands in ordinary web traffic (Check Point's LIONTAIL, Talos's HTTPSnoop), masquerading as Exchange Web Services or security-product components, and a kernel-mode driver repurposed from an Iranian anti-virus product.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: MOIS-affiliated

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources
  • Mandiant (Research, 2024-09-19)
    Likely affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security
  • Check Point Research (Research, 2023-10-31)
    Tracks it as Scarred Manticore, MOIS-affiliated
  • CrowdStrike (Research, 2026-10-15)
    Iranian state-nexus adversary

Campaigns 4

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
STAYSHANTE / SASHEYAWAY indicators in the March 2024 Israeli wiper attacks2024-03IsraelManaged Service Providers, Local Government, AcademiaMandiant (2024-09-19)
ShroudedSnooper HTTPSnoop/PipeSnoop against Middle East telecommunications providers2022-08 – 2023-04Middle EastTelecommunicationsCisco Talos (2023-09-19)
Scarred Manticore LIONTAIL espionage against Middle East government, military and telecoms2022 – 2023Middle EastGovernment, Military, TelecommunicationsCheck Point Research (2023-10-31)
Initial-access and staging operations against Middle East networks (Saudi and Qatari targets)2019 – 2020Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Middle EastGovernment, MultipleMandiant (2024-09-19)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 4

Persistence1T1505.003Web Shell
Stealth1T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Command and Control2T1090ProxyT1071.001Web Protocols

Malware and tools 11

NameDescriptionPlatform
TEMPLEDOORPassive backdoor (HTTP listener)Windows
TEMPLEPLAYGUI controller for TEMPLEDOOR, enables hand-off to other operatorsWindows
VIROGREENGUI controller framework (controls STAYSHANTE)Windows
STAYSHANTEWeb shellWindows
SASHEYAWAYDropper for passive backdoorsWindows
FACEFACEPassive backdoorWindows
SPARKLOADPassive backdoor loaderWindows
LIONTAILFramework of HTTP.sys-based passive loaders and in-memory shellcode payloadsWindows
LIONHEADWeb forwarder to Exchange Web ServicesWindows
HTTPSnoopBackdoor listening on HTTP kernel driver URLs (masquerades as Cortex XDR)Windows
PipeSnoopShellcode loader over named pipesWindows

Infrastructure patterns

  • Passive implants (TEMPLEDOOR) on compromised servers, built for hand-off to other actors (Mandiant, 2024)

Reporting and advisories 3