TGR-STA-1030
Also known asUNC6619
Summary
Asia-based, state-aligned cyberespionage group designated by Unit 42 in Feb 2026 (Unit 42: high confidence it is state-aligned and operates out of Asia; no country named). In roughly a year it compromised at least 70 government and critical-infrastructure organisations across 37 countries — national law enforcement, border control, ministries of interior, foreign affairs, finance and energy, elected officials and national telecoms — and between Nov and Dec 2025 actively reconnoitred government infrastructure in 155 countries. Uses phishing, exploitation kits, custom malware (Diaoyu loader, ShadowGuard Linux rootkit), web shells and tunnelling/proxy tools; prioritises targets with economic-partnership ties to specific regional interests. Attribution: Unit 42 names no state. Reuters (12 Feb 2026) reported, citing unnamed sources, that Palo Alto had linked the activity to China and withheld that for fear of retaliation; Palo Alto dismissed the claim. Treat any China attribution as claimed, not confirmed.
Attribution
Operates out of Asia; no country named
Tracked by researchers; no state or organisation has been publicly attributed.
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (Research, 2026-02-05)
High confidence: a state-aligned group operating out of Asia
Campaigns 3
| Campaign | Period | Targets | Sectors | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Venezuela government reconnaissance after Operation Absolute Resolve | 2026-01 | Venezuela | Government, Technology | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2026-02-05) |
| Global government-infrastructure reconnaissance (155 countries) | 2025-11 – 2025-12 | Global (155 countries) | Government | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2026-02-05) |
| Shadow Campaigns — government & critical-infrastructure compromises (37 countries) | 2025-02 – ongoing | Global, EU, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Southeast Asia, Africa | Government, Law Enforcement, Telecommunications, Finance, Energy | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2026-02-05) |
Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques 8
| Initial Access2 | T1566.002Spearphishing LinkT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application |
|---|---|
| Persistence1 | T1505.003Web Shell |
| Stealth1 | T1014Rootkit |
| Discovery1 | T1083File and Directory Discovery |
| Exfiltration1 | T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
| Command and Control2 | T1572Protocol TunnelingT1090Proxy |
Malware and tools 10
| Name | Description | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| Diaoyu | Loader (phishing payload) | Windows |
| ShadowGuard | eBPF kernel rootkit | Linux |
| VShell | C2 framework (Go) | Windows/Linux |
| Cobalt Strike | Post-exploitation framework | Windows |
| Behinder | Web shell | Windows/Linux |
| Godzilla | Web shell | Windows/Linux |
| Neo-reGeorg | Web shell / tunnel | Windows/Linux |
| GOST | Tunnelling tool | Windows/Linux |
| FRPS | Reverse proxy (tunnelling) | Windows/Linux |
| IOX | Tunnelling / port-forwarding tool | Windows/Linux |
Exploited vulnerabilities 1
| CVE | CVSS | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-11580 | 9.8 | Atlassian Crowd — RCE, exploitation attempt (KEV 2021-11-03) |
Highest CVSS first.
Infrastructure patterns
- C2 servers leased from common, legitimate VPS providers (Unit 42, 2026)
Reporting and advisories 1
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42
Shadow Campaigns — government & critical-infrastructure compromises (37 countries)