ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
Non-stateCriminal groupFinancialActive 2025 – 2026

TeamPCP

Also known asPCPcat · DeadCatx3 · ShellForce · SHADOW-WATER-058 · Storm-2999

Summary

Financially motivated criminal threat group executing systematic software supply chain attacks against CI/CD infrastructure. Google GTIG tracks as UNC6780; also known as PCPcat, ShellForce, DeadCatx3 and SHADOW-WATER-058 (Trend Micro); MITRE ATT&CK G1056. Sep 2025: Shai-Hulud worm — first self-replicating npm malware — marked end of nuisance-era supply chain attacks. Mar 19–27 2026: cascading campaign compromising Trivy (Aqua Security), KICS (Checkmarx), LiteLLM (AI gateway), Telnyx Python SDK, and 47+ npm packages — CVE-2026-33634 (CISA KEV, remediation deadline Apr 9). CanisterWorm's findNpmTokens() harvests long-lived npm tokens from CI/CD environments; these tokens were distributed to ~300,000 BreachForums users. Apr 21–23 2026: three simultaneous attacks on npm, PyPI, and Docker Hub. Apr 22–29 2026: Shai-Hulud Third Coming targeting SAP-related packages. May 11 2026: Mini Shai-Hulud — largest coordinated registry poisoning event of 2026: 170+ npm packages, 2 PyPI packages (TanStack router ecosystem 42 pkgs, Mistral AI SDK, UiPath 65 pkgs, OpenSearch 1.3M weekly downloads, Guardrails AI) — 404 malicious versions. Wiper component added. Source code open-sourced, enabling copycat campaigns. Announced operational partnerships with CipherForce and Vect ransomware for credential monetisation. TTPs: CI/CD token harvesting, dependency confusion, hijacking release pipelines, self-replicating worm propagation.

Attribution

Non-stateNon-state actor: Criminal group

No state link

Criminal or hacktivist group; no state sponsorship established.

Sources

Campaigns 4

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 14

Resource Development1T1683.001Written Content
Initial Access3T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainT1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution4T1610Deploy ContainerT1059.004Unix ShellT1677Poisoned Pipeline ExecutionT1059.013Container CLI/API
Persistence1T1176.002IDE Extensions
Privilege Escalation1T1546.016Installer Packages
Credential Access3T1552.001Credentials In FilesT1555.006Cloud Secrets Management StoresT1528Steal Application Access Token
Impact1T1496Resource Hijacking

Malware and tools 6

NameDescriptionPlatform
Cryptominer PayloadsMinerLinux/Container
SANDCLOCK (TeamPCP Cloud Stealer)Credential stealerLinux/macOS/Windows/Containers
CanisterWormSelf-propagating worm / credential harvester (ICP canister C2)Linux/Containers
Mini Shai-HuludSelf-replicating supply-chain worm / credential stealerCross-platform (npm/PyPI)
MiasmaSelf-propagating worm (Mini Shai-Hulud variant)Cross-platform (npm/PyPI)
TeamPCP Cloud StealerMalwareContainers/Linux/macOS/SaaS/Windows

Exploited vulnerabilities 2

CVECVSSDetail
CVE-2025-5518210React Server Components — React2Shell unauthenticated RCE (KEV 2025-12-05)
CVE-2026-336349.4Aqua Security Trivy / trivy-action / setup-trivy — embedded malicious code via hijacked release tags (KEV 2026-03-26)

Highest CVSS first.

Infrastructure patterns

  • Poisoned distribution channels — Docker Hub images, VS Code/OpenVSX extensions, GitHub Actions (Trend Micro, 2026)
  • Typosquatted C2 and exfiltration domains, e.g. scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org, checkmarx[.]zone (Unit 42, 2026)

Reporting and advisories 5