ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
ChinaAttributedPRC state-sponsoredEspionageActive 2019 – 2025

Salt Typhoon

Also known asEarth Estries · GhostEmperor · OPERATOR PANDA

Summary

PRC state-sponsored espionage actor behind the compromise of major telecommunications providers' network infrastructure, described by the 13-nation joint advisory AA25-239A (Aug 2025): exploitation of edge devices — Cisco IOS XE (CVE-2023-20198/20273), Ivanti (CVE-2023-46805/CVE-2024-21887), Palo Alto PAN-OS (CVE-2024-3400) — router configuration changes, GRE tunnels and packet capture to collect communications, with targeting of telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging and military infrastructure worldwide. The advisory notes the activity 'partially overlaps' industry names including Salt Typhoon, OPERATOR PANDA, RedMike, UNC5807 and GhostEmperor; Trend Micro tracks it as Earth Estries. Contractor companies including Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology provide services to multiple PLA and MSS units. Microsoft also maps FamousSparrow into this cluster, but ESET, which named FamousSparrow, tracks it separately — see the FamousSparrow record.

Attribution

AttributedGovernment attribution: PRC state-sponsored

Contractor firms serve PLA and MSS units

Named by a government: indictment, sanctions designation, joint advisory or official statement.

Sources

Campaigns 3

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Canadian telecommunications provider — Cisco IOS XE CVE-2023-20198, configuration theft and GRE tunnelASSESSED2025-02CanadaTelecommunicationsCanadian Centre for Cyber Security and FBI (2025-06) — "likely Salt Typhoon actors"
RedMike — Cisco IOS XE exploitation of telecoms and universities2024-12 – 2025-01USA, South Africa, Italy, Thailand, Myanmar, Argentina, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, VietnamTelecommunications, AcademiaRecorded Future Insikt Group (2025-02-13)
Global Telecom Backbone Compromise2021 – ongoingUSA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, GlobalTelecommunications, Government, Transportation, Lodging, Military infrastructureNSA/CISA/FBI + partners AA25-239A (2025-08-27; IC3 copy)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 21

Reconnaissance1T1590.004Network Topology
Initial Access1T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution1T1059.008Network Device CLI
Persistence5T1078Valid AccountsT1542.005TFTP BootT1098.004SSH Authorized KeysT1136Create AccountT1543.005Container Service
Stealth1T1070.009Clear Persistence
Defense Impairment2T1685.006Clear Linux or Mac System LogsT1686.002Network Device Firewall
Credential Access3T1556Modify Authentication ProcessT1040Network SniffingT1110.002Password Cracking
Lateral Movement1T1021.001Remote Desktop Protocol
Collection3T1560Archive Collected DataT1602.002Network Device Configuration DumpT1602.001SNMP (MIB Dump)
Exfiltration2T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolT1020.001Traffic Duplication
Command and Control1T1071.001Web Protocols

Malware and tools 3

NameDescriptionPlatform
GhostSpiderBackdoorWindows
SNAPPYBEE (Deed RAT)Modular BackdoorWindows
JumbledPathMalwareNetwork Devices

Exploited vulnerabilities 6

CVECVSSDetail
CVE-2023-2019810Cisco IOS XE Web UI (KEV 2023-10-16)
CVE-2024-340010Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect — OS command injection (KEV 2024-04-12)
CVE-2018-01719.8Cisco Smart Install (KEV 2021-11-03)
CVE-2024-218879.1Ivanti Connect Secure / Policy Secure — web-component command injection (KEV 2024-01-10)
CVE-2023-468058.2Ivanti Connect Secure / Policy Secure — authentication bypass (KEV 2024-01-10)
CVE-2023-202737.2Cisco IOS XE Privilege Escalation (KEV 2023-10-23)

Highest CVSS first.

Infrastructure patterns

  • Backbone, provider-edge and customer-edge routers used to pivot into other networks (CISA et al., 2025)
  • Custom SFTP clients move files to staging hosts before exfiltration (CISA et al., 2025)
  • SSH servers and non-standard ports opened on network devices for remote access (CISA et al., 2025)

Reporting and advisories 5