ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
IranAssessedIRGCMixedActive 2013 – 2025

Refined Kitten

Also known asPeach Sandstorm · HOLMIUM · Elfin · Magnallium · ATK 35 · TA451 · Cobalt Trinity · Yellow Orc · Curious Serpens

Summary

IRGC-linked Iranian APT (Microsoft: Peach Sandstorm; CrowdStrike: Refined Kitten; FireEye/Mandiant: APT33; Dragos: Magnallium). Microsoft assesses that it operates on behalf of the IRGC. Mandiant (2017) reported a particular interest in aviation and in energy organisations tied to petrochemical production, headquartered in the US, Saudi Arabia and South Korea; it linked APT33's DROPSHOT dropper to the SHAPESHIFT wiper but had not observed the group carry out destructive operations. Trademark TTPs: password spraying at scale against M365/Entra ID, exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine and Atlassian Confluence, deployment of custom Tickler and FalseFont backdoors. Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Aug 2024): Tickler backdoor deployed against satellite, oil & gas, and government targets in the US and the UAE via Azure-hosted infrastructure. Nozomi Networks telemetry (Jul 2025) attributed attacks on at least three US companies, mainly in transportation and manufacturing, to APT33 during May–June 2025; no 2026 activity has been publicly attributed to the group.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources

Campaigns 4

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
US transportation & manufacturing attacks (Israel–Iran war period)2025-05 – 2025-06USATransportation, ManufacturingNozomi Networks Labs (2025-07-08)
Password spray — US & Australia2024-04 – 2024-05USA, AustraliaDefense, Space, Education, GovernmentMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (2024-08-28)
Tickler backdoor deployments2024-04 – 2024-07USA, UAESatellite, Communications equipment, Oil & Gas, GovernmentMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (2024-08-28)
Peach Sandstorm password spray & Zoho/Confluence exploitation wave2023-02 – 2023-07GlobalSatellite, Defense, PharmaceuticalMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (2023-09-14)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 7

Resource Development1T1583.006Web Services
Initial Access2T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution1T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence1T1078Valid Accounts
Credential Access1T1110.003Password Spraying
Lateral Movement1T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Malware and tools 5

NameDescriptionPlatform
DROPSHOT/SHAPESHIFTDropper/WiperWindows
TURNEDUPBackdoorWindows
NANOCORERATWindows
FalseFontBackdoorWindows
TicklerCustom BackdoorWindows

Exploited vulnerabilities 3

CVECVSSDetail
CVE-2022-261349.8Atlassian Confluence Server/Data Center — OGNL injection RCE (KEV 2022-06-02)
CVE-2022-479669.8Zoho ManageEngine — unauthenticated RCE via Apache Santuario (KEV 2023-01-23)
CVE-2017-02137.3Microsoft Windows COM Aggregate Marshaler — privilege escalation (KEV 2022-03-28)

Highest CVSS first.

Infrastructure patterns

  • Password sprays from Tor exits ("go-http-client" UA); follow-on logins via commercial VPNs (Microsoft, 2023; Microsoft, 2024)
  • Fraudulent Azure subscriptions, bought via compromised education accounts, host Tickler C2 (Microsoft, 2024)
  • Azure Arc links victim devices to its Azure subscription; EagleRelay tunnels traffic out (Microsoft, 2023)
  • HTTP C2 over non-standard TCP ports 808 and 880 (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026)

Reporting and advisories 6