Red Menshen
Also known asEarth Bluecrow · BRONZE SIESTA
Summary
China-nexus espionage group known for BPFDoor, a stealth Linux backdoor that abuses Berkeley Packet Filter functionality to inspect traffic inside the kernel and wakes only on a crafted trigger packet (T1205.002), then opens a reverse shell (T1059.004). Trend Micro, which tracks it as Earth Bluecrow, attributed a previously unseen BPFDoor controller to it with medium confidence in April 2025, from 2024 attacks on telecommunications, finance and retail organisations in South Korea, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Malaysia and Egypt; BPFDoor's source code leaked in 2022, so the backdoor alone does not identify the group. In March 2026 Rapid7 described a long-term, ongoing operation placing BPFDoor "sleeper cells" in telecommunications networks, positioned beside subscriber data and signalling, with government networks among the espionage targets. Sophos CTU tracks it as BRONZE SIESTA, with activity across Asia and the Middle East. active_since is the earliest dated attack in this record (2024), not the group's origin.
Attribution
Vendor assessments (Rapid7, Sophos CTU); no state body named
Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.
- Rapid7 Labs (Research, 2026-03-26)
A China-nexus threat actor - Sophos CTU (Research, 2026-10)
A China-nexus APT group
Campaigns 2
| Campaign | Period | Targets | Sectors | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BPFDoor "sleeper cells" in telecommunications networks | 2026 – ongoing | Undisclosed | Telecommunications, Government | Rapid7 Labs (2026-03-26) — "a long-term and ongoing operation"; ongoing at publication; countries not named in the text |
| BPFDoor controller attacks on telecom, finance and retail organisations in Asia and the Middle EastASSESSED | 2024-01 – 2024-12 | South Korea, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Malaysia, Egypt | Telecommunications, Financial Services, Retail | Trend Micro (2025-04-14) — attributed to Earth Bluecrow with medium confidence; still active at publication |
Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques 2
| Execution1 | T1059.004Unix Shell |
|---|---|
| Persistence1 | T1205.002Socket Filters |
Malware and tools 1
| Name | Description | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| BPFDoor | Linux backdoor (BPF socket filter) | Linux |
Infrastructure patterns
- BPFDoor controllers run from compromised routers, external systems or inside the victim network (Rapid7, 2026)
- ICMP relays pass commands between infected hosts without classic C2 traffic (Rapid7, 2026)