ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
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IranAttributedMOISEspionageActive 2017 – 2026

MuddyWater

Also known asMuddy Water · Static Kitten · MERCURY · Seedworm · TA450 · Yellow Nix · TEMP.Zagros · Cobalt Ulster · Mango Sandstorm · Boggy Serpens · ATK51 · T-APT-14 · ITG17 · Earth Vetala · MuddyKrill

Summary

MOIS-linked Iranian APT (Microsoft: Mango Sandstorm, formerly MERCURY; CrowdStrike: Static Kitten; Proofpoint: TA450; Symantec: Seedworm; ESET: it "may be acting as an initial access broker for other Iran-aligned groups"). Operation Olalampo (Group-IB, first observed 26 Jan 2026, active into mid-Feb 2026) deployed four previously unseen malware families against MENA targets: GhostFetch, CHAR (Telegram-bot C2), HTTP_VIP, and GhostBackDoor. From February 2026 Symantec observed the group on networks of a US bank, airport and software company with the Deno-based Dindoor backdoor. The group also hides behind criminal brands: the October 2025 Qilin-branded attack on Israel's Shamir Medical Center (likely Iranian operators per Check Point; linked to MuddyWater per Rapid7) and an early-2026 Chaos ransomware false flag (Rapid7, moderate confidence).

Attribution

AttributedGovernment attribution: MOIS

Ministry of Intelligence and Security

Named by a government: indictment, sanctions designation, joint advisory or official statement.

Sources

Campaigns 14

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Compromised Israeli IT vendor used to spearphish Israel and the US — ScreenConnect payload2026-08Israel, USATechnologyESET Research (2026-10-28) — MuddyWater "came back online" after a wartime lull
Seedworm — US bank, airport, software company and non-profits (Dindoor)2026-02 – ongoingUSA, Canada, IsraelFinancial Services, Aviation, Software, NGOSymantec / Carbon Black (2026-03-05)
Operation Olalampo2026-01 – 2026-02MENAEnergy, Marine Services, TelecommunicationsGroup-IB (2026-02-20)
Seedworm Q1 2026 global espionage — Node.js loader, signed-binary DLL side-loading, ChromElevator2026-01 – 2026-03South Korea, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin AmericaElectronics Manufacturing, Industrial Manufacturing, Aviation, Government, Education, Financial Services, Professional ServicesSymantec / Carbon Black (2026-05-26)
Chaos ransomware false flag via Microsoft Teams vishingASSESSED2026USAMultipleRapid7 (2026-05-06)
Egyptian financial institution intrusion2025-11EgyptFinancial ServicesTrellix (2026-03-05)
International organisation headquartered in Saudi Arabia (pre-war)2025-10 – 2026-02Saudi ArabiaInternational OrganisationsESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026 (2026-05-28)
Qilin-branded attack on Shamir Medical CenterASSESSED2025-10IsraelHealthcareCheck Point Research (2026-03-10); Rapid7 (2026-05-06)
Phoenix v4 phishing via compromised mailbox — 100+ government entities2025-08MENA, GlobalGovernment, International OrganisationsGroup-IB (2025-10-22)
US transportation & manufacturing attacks (Israel–Iran war period)2025-05 – 2025-06USATransportation, ManufacturingNozomi Networks Labs (2025-07-08)
Internal Spearphishing via Compromised Mailbox2025-04 – 2025-09Middle East, EUGovernment, FinancialESET APT Activity Report Q2–Q3 2025 (2025-11-06)
RMM-software spearphishing waves2024-10 – 2025-03Israel, Cambodia, KenyaEngineering, Government, ManufacturingESET APT Activity Report Q4 2024–Q1 2025 (2025-05-19)
MuddyViper / Fooder — Israel & Egypt critical infrastructure2024-09 – 2025-03Israel, EgyptEngineering, Local Government, Manufacturing, Technology, Transportation, Utilities, AcademiaESET (2025-12-02)
Destructive attack on a hybrid on-premises and Azure environment, handed to DEV-1084 (DarkBit persona)2022-07 – 2023UndisclosedUndisclosedMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (2023-04-07) — MERCURY (Mango Sandstorm) gained access, including Log4j 2 exploitation in July 2022, then handed off to DEV-1084 (Storm-1084), which posed as the DarkBit ransomware persona; end is the publication year; victim not named

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 16

Reconnaissance1T1590.004Network Topology
Initial Access2T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1566Phishing
Execution4T1059.001PowerShellT1047Windows Management InstrumentationT1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteT1059.007JavaScript
Stealth1T1574.001DLL
Credential Access1T1003.002Security Account Manager
Lateral Movement1T1534Internal Spearphishing
Exfiltration2T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Command and Control4T1219Remote Access ToolsT1090ProxyT1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareT1102.002Bidirectional Communication

Malware and tools 20

NameDescriptionPlatform
PhonyC2PowerShell C2 FrameworkWindows
BugSleepCustom BackdoorWindows
DarkBitRansomware under the DarkBit persona — deployed by DEV-1084 after MERCURY access (Microsoft)Windows
PowGoopLoaderWindows
GhostFetchCustom LoaderWindows
CHARCustom BackdoorWindows
HTTP_VIPC2 BeaconWindows
GhostBackDoorBackdoorWindows
MuddyViperC/C++ backdoorWindows
FooderReflective loader (Snake-game masquerade)Windows
LP-NotesCredential stealerWindows
CE-NotesBrowser-data stealerWindows
BlubBrowser-data stealerWindows
PhoenixBackdoor (v4 in 2025)Windows
FakeUpdateAES injector-style loaderWindows
UDPGangsterUDP-based backdoorWindows
RustyWaterRust implantWindows
StealthCacheCustom implantWindows
DindoorDeno-runtime backdoor (Tsundere botnet variant)Windows
ChromElevatorOpen-source Chromium credential/cookie stealer (App-Bound Encryption bypass), sideloadedWindows

Exploited vulnerabilities 3

CVECVSSDetail
CVE-2020-147210Microsoft Netlogon — Zerologon privilege escalation (KEV 2021-11-03)
CVE-2020-06888.8Exchange Validation Key (KEV 2021-11-03)
CVE-2017-01997.8Microsoft Office/WordPad — RTF/HTA remote code execution (KEV 2021-11-03)

Highest CVSS first.

Infrastructure patterns

  • Legitimate RMM tools for access — ConnectWise, RemoteUtilities, SimpleHelp, AnyDesk (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026; Group-IB, 2026)
  • Compromised mailbox used to send phishing to 100+ government entities (Group-IB, 2025)

Reporting and advisories 16