ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
IranAssessedIRGC-affiliatedEspionageActive 2021 – 2026

Mirage Kitten

Also known asUNC1549 · Smoke Sandstorm · Nimbus Manticore · Screening Serpens · TA455 · COBALT SMOKEY

Summary

Iran-nexus espionage group targeting aviation, aerospace, defence and FinTech organisations across the Middle East and Africa (Kaspersky GReAT: Mirage Kitten; Mandiant: UNC1549; Microsoft: Smoke Sandstorm; Check Point: Nimbus Manticore; PRODAFT: Subtle Snail — a cluster Check Point treats as separate). Defining tradecraft is fake-recruitment social engineering: operators run recruiter personas on LinkedIn and job platforms, then deliver trojanized "coding challenge" archives from legitimate cloud storage (Amazon S3, previously onlyoffice.com). Lures are working Express/React/Vite applications whose README imposes a short time limit and explicitly prohibits AI assistants — which conveniently prevents an AI code review from flagging the single altered source file. Malicious npm packages (colorized_terminal, pretty-log, both pinned to 2.1.0) ship bundled inside node_modules rather than published to the registry, so the implant executes on first import. Through mid-2026 the group shifted from native C/C++/Go malware deployed via DLL search-order hijacking to cross-platform Node.js and JavaScript implants (NodeRabbit, PollCat) that run on Windows, Linux and macOS from one codebase and blend into developer workstations. C2 runs through Azure Websites subdomains and Cloudflare-fronted domains; in some intrusions operators embedded the victim organisation’s own name in the Azure subdomain so beacons resembled ordinary corporate traffic. Kaspersky attributes NodeRabbit and PollCat with high confidence on shared C2 handshake logic, identical beacon timing constants and overlapping command identifiers with the group’s earlier Retrograde/MiniFast backdoor.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: IRGC-affiliated

No government attribution on record

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources
  • MITRE ATT&CK (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026-10)
    State-sponsored group associated with the IRGC

Campaigns 7

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
NightLedger / BridgeHead intrusions2026-04 – 2026Egypt, Pakistan, Middle EastAerospace, AviationKaspersky GReAT (2026-07-28)
2026 wartime waves — AppDomain hijacking, Zoom-installer lure, SEO-poisoned SQL Developer site (MiniFast)2026-02 – 2026-04Saudi Arabia, Australia, USA, Israel, UAE, EuropeAviation, Software Development, AerospaceCheck Point Research (2026-05-22)
Screening Serpens 2026 waves (MiniUpdate / MiniJunk V2)ASSESSED2026-02 – 2026-04USA, Israel, UAE, Middle EastTechnology, Aerospace, Defense, TelecommunicationsUnit 42 (2026-05-22)
Fake Coding Challenge Recruitment2026 – ongoingEgypt, Ethiopia, AfghanistanAviation, Aerospace, FinTechKaspersky GReAT (2026-09-01)
Nimbus Manticore — European telecom/defence recruitment lures2025 – ongoingDenmark, Sweden, Portugal, Israel, UAEDefense, Telecommunications, AviationCheck Point Research (2025-09-22)
PRODAFT 'Subtle Snail' — telecom intrusions via recruitment lures (34 devices, 11 organisations)ASSESSED2025Canada, France, UAE, UK, USATelecommunicationsPRODAFT, via The Hacker News (2025-09-19)
Aerospace & defence supply-chain intrusions (third-party pivots, VDI breakout)2023 – 2025Middle EastAerospace, Aviation, DefenseMandiant (2025-11-17)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 34

Reconnaissance1T1598.001Spearphishing Service
Resource Development4T1585.001Social Media AccountsT1583.006Web ServicesT1608.006SEO PoisoningT1588.003Code Signing Certificates
Initial Access2T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceT1199Trusted Relationship
Execution2T1204.002Malicious FileT1059.007JavaScript
Persistence4T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderT1053.005Scheduled TaskT1053.003CronT1543.001Launch Agent
Stealth5T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationT1497.001System ChecksT1027Obfuscated Files or InformationT1574.001DLLT1574.014AppDomainManager
Defense Impairment1T1685.003Modify or Spoof Tool UI
Credential Access2T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesT1003.006DCSync
Discovery4T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryT1057Process DiscoveryT1083File and Directory DiscoveryT1016System Network Configuration Discovery
Lateral Movement1T1563.002RDP Hijacking
Collection3T1005Data from Local SystemT1114.001Local Email CollectionT1213Data from Information Repositories
Exfiltration1T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Command and Control4T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1573.001Symmetric CryptographyT1102Web ServiceT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Malware and tools 18

NameDescriptionPlatform
NodeRabbitCross-platform Node.js RAT; 11–23 commands, AES-256-GCM C2, sandbox checks, corporate proxy tunnelling, VS Code extension and Git hook persistenceWindows/Linux/macOS
PollCatObfuscated JavaScript RAT launched from a trojanized React challenge before OTP auth completes; 22 commands over a binary protocol, treats HTTP 400 as a successful handshakeWindows/Linux/macOS
NightLedgerBackdoor documented in the July 2026 toolsetWindows
ArcBridgeTunnelling tool used for network pivotingWindows
BridgeHeadTunnelling tool used for network pivotingWindows
MiniFast/RetrogradeNative DLL backdoor sharing C2 handshake, beacon timing and command IDs with PollCatWindows
TWOSTROKEC++ backdoor, SSL over TCP/443Windows
DEEPROOTGolang backdoorLinux
LIGHTRAILTunneler over Azure infrastructure (Lastenzug-based)Windows
GHOSTLINEGolang tunneler (go-yamux)Windows
POLLBLENDC++ tunnelerWindows
DCSYNCER.SLICKDCSync credential tool (Mimikatz-based)Windows
SIGHTGRABScreenshot capture toolWindows
TRUSTTRAPFake credential promptWindows
CRASHPADCredential decryptor (CryptUnprotectData)Windows
MINIBIKE/MiniJunkC++ backdoor loaded by DLL side-loadingWindows
MiniBrowseBrowser credential stealerWindows
MiniBusMalwareWindows

Infrastructure patterns

  • Azure Web App subdomains as C2, some carrying the target organisation's name (Kaspersky, 2026)
  • Cloudflare-fronted, often career-themed domains, some registered through NameCheap (Check Point, 2025; Kaspersky, 2026)
  • Amazon S3 buckets host the initial ZIP lures (Kaspersky, 2026)
  • Trojanized npm packages bundled in the lure's node_modules, never published to npm (Kaspersky, 2026)

Reporting and advisories 8