GALLIUM
Also known asGranite Typhoon · Alloy Taurus · Phantom Panda · Softcell
Summary
Cyber-espionage group active since at least 2012, tracked as GALLIUM / Granite Typhoon by Microsoft, Alloy Taurus by Unit 42, Phantom Panda by CrowdStrike and G0093 by MITRE, and associated with Operation Soft Cell, a long-running campaign against telecommunications providers. Unit 42 calls it a suspected nation-state actor attributed to China, and MITRE says researchers consider it likely Chinese state-sponsored, based on tooling and TTPs. Microsoft observed telecom intrusions mostly from 2018 to mid-2019. Initial access came through exploitation of unpatched internet-facing services such as WildFly/JBoss (T1190), followed by China Chopper and the IIS web shell BlackMould (T1505.003), credential dumping (T1003.001), tools signed with stolen code-signing certificates (T1553.002), SoftEther VPN for persistent access (T1133) and WinRAR staging (T1560.001). Payloads included the modified Gh0st RAT QuarkBandit and Poison Ivy, controlled from Taiwan-based servers exclusive to the group (T1583.004). In 2021–22 it widened from telecoms to financial institutions and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia and Vietnam. That phase introduced PingPull, a RAT using ICMP, HTTP(S) or raw TCP for C2 (T1095) that installs as a service imitating iphlpsvc (T1543.003, T1036.004). In 2023 Unit 42 reported a Linux PingPull variant and the Sword2033 backdoor. A C2 domain impersonated the South African military, and traffic came from a Nepalese infrastructure-finance organisation, which suggests that organisation was compromised.
Attribution
No service publicly named
Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.
- MITRE ATT&CK (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026-10)
Likely Chinese state-sponsored - Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (Research, 2025-08-01)
Suspected nation-state group attributed to China
Campaigns 3
| Campaign | Period | Targets | Sectors | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux PingPull variant and Sword2033 backdoor — Nepalese infrastructure-finance organisation (traffic-based)ASSESSED | 2022-07 – 2023-03 | Nepal | Financial Services | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2023-04-26) |
| PingPull operations against telecommunications, financial and government entities | 2021-09 – 2022-06 | Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Philippines, Russia, Vietnam | Telecommunications, Financial Services, Government | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2022-06-13) |
| Telecommunications-provider intrusions (MSTIC GALLIUM; Operation Soft Cell) | 2018 – 2019-06 | Undisclosed | Telecommunications | Microsoft MSTIC (2019-12-12); MITRE G0093 citing Cybereason (2019-06) |
Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques 10
| Resource Development1 | T1583.004Server |
|---|---|
| Initial Access1 | T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Persistence3 | T1505.003Web ShellT1133External Remote ServicesT1543.003Windows Service |
| Stealth1 | T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service |
| Defense Impairment1 | T1553.002Code Signing |
| Credential Access1 | T1003.001LSASS Memory |
| Collection1 | T1560.001Archive via Utility |
| Command and Control1 | T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Malware and tools 4
| Name | Description | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| PingPull | RAT (ICMP, HTTP(S) or raw TCP C2; Linux variant 2023) | Windows/Linux |
| BlackMould | Web shell (native IIS, China Chopper-based) | Web Servers |
| QuarkBandit | RAT (modified Gh0st RAT) | Windows |
| Sword2033 | Backdoor | Linux |
Infrastructure patterns
- Domains hosted in mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan (Microsoft, 2019)
- Cheap, replaceable infrastructure: dynamic-DNS domains and reused hop points (Microsoft, 2019)
- C2 domains impersonating a target country's military (South Africa, Unit 42 2023)