ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
ChinaAssessedChina-linkedEspionageActive 2012 – 2022

GALLIUM

Also known asGranite Typhoon · Alloy Taurus · Phantom Panda · Softcell

Summary

Cyber-espionage group active since at least 2012, tracked as GALLIUM / Granite Typhoon by Microsoft, Alloy Taurus by Unit 42, Phantom Panda by CrowdStrike and G0093 by MITRE, and associated with Operation Soft Cell, a long-running campaign against telecommunications providers. Unit 42 calls it a suspected nation-state actor attributed to China, and MITRE says researchers consider it likely Chinese state-sponsored, based on tooling and TTPs. Microsoft observed telecom intrusions mostly from 2018 to mid-2019. Initial access came through exploitation of unpatched internet-facing services such as WildFly/JBoss (T1190), followed by China Chopper and the IIS web shell BlackMould (T1505.003), credential dumping (T1003.001), tools signed with stolen code-signing certificates (T1553.002), SoftEther VPN for persistent access (T1133) and WinRAR staging (T1560.001). Payloads included the modified Gh0st RAT QuarkBandit and Poison Ivy, controlled from Taiwan-based servers exclusive to the group (T1583.004). In 2021–22 it widened from telecoms to financial institutions and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia and Vietnam. That phase introduced PingPull, a RAT using ICMP, HTTP(S) or raw TCP for C2 (T1095) that installs as a service imitating iphlpsvc (T1543.003, T1036.004). In 2023 Unit 42 reported a Linux PingPull variant and the Sword2033 backdoor. A C2 domain impersonated the South African military, and traffic came from a Nepalese infrastructure-finance organisation, which suggests that organisation was compromised.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: China-linked

No service publicly named

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources

Campaigns 3

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Linux PingPull variant and Sword2033 backdoor — Nepalese infrastructure-finance organisation (traffic-based)ASSESSED2022-07 – 2023-03NepalFinancial ServicesPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2023-04-26)
PingPull operations against telecommunications, financial and government entities2021-09 – 2022-06Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Philippines, Russia, VietnamTelecommunications, Financial Services, GovernmentPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 (2022-06-13)
Telecommunications-provider intrusions (MSTIC GALLIUM; Operation Soft Cell)2018 – 2019-06UndisclosedTelecommunicationsMicrosoft MSTIC (2019-12-12); MITRE G0093 citing Cybereason (2019-06)

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 10

Resource Development1T1583.004Server
Initial Access1T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Persistence3T1505.003Web ShellT1133External Remote ServicesT1543.003Windows Service
Stealth1T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service
Defense Impairment1T1553.002Code Signing
Credential Access1T1003.001LSASS Memory
Collection1T1560.001Archive via Utility
Command and Control1T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

Malware and tools 4

NameDescriptionPlatform
PingPullRAT (ICMP, HTTP(S) or raw TCP C2; Linux variant 2023)Windows/Linux
BlackMouldWeb shell (native IIS, China Chopper-based)Web Servers
QuarkBanditRAT (modified Gh0st RAT)Windows
Sword2033BackdoorLinux

Infrastructure patterns

  • Domains hosted in mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan (Microsoft, 2019)
  • Cheap, replaceable infrastructure: dynamic-DNS domains and reused hop points (Microsoft, 2019)
  • C2 domains impersonating a target country's military (South Africa, Unit 42 2023)

Reporting and advisories 3