ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
IranAssessedIranEspionageActive 2018 – 2019

DNSpionage

Also known asCOBALT EDGEWATER

Summary

Espionage cluster that Cisco Talos named in November 2018 after its DNSpionage remote-access tool, which talks to its operators over HTTP and DNS tunnelling (T1071.004). Talos found it targeting Lebanon and the UAE, affecting .gov domains and a private Lebanese airline, through fake job-posting websites and macro-laden Office documents (T1204.002) that dropped the tool under a scheduled task (T1053.005); Talos does not know how the documents reached victims, and judges email spear-phishing most likely, with LinkedIn possible. The same operators redirected the DNS of legitimate .gov and private domains and generated Let's Encrypt certificates for each redirected domain (T1584.002, T1588.004). In 2019 Talos saw a new reconnaissance stage that chose which victims received malware, and a new .NET backdoor, Karkoff; it rated the link to OilRig, from that April's leak, as weak. Sophos CTU, which tracks the cluster as COBALT EDGEWATER, assesses with moderate confidence that it operates on behalf of Iran, focused on Lebanon and the UAE. Sophos lists "Cold River (Lastline)" among its aliases; that 2019 name is not used here, because it collides with the unrelated Russian COLDRIVER.

Attribution

AssessedResearch assessment: Iran

Single vendor (Sophos CTU, moderate); Talos does not attribute and calls the OilRig link weak

Assessed by security researchers or MITRE ATT&CK; no government attribution on record.

Sources
  • Sophos CTU (Research, 2026-10)
    Operates on behalf of Iran (moderate confidence)

Campaigns 2

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Selective-infection reconnaissance stage and Karkoff backdoor2019-02 – 2019-04LebanonUndisclosedCisco Talos (2019-04-23)
Fake job sites and DNS redirection against Lebanese and UAE .gov domains and a Lebanese airline2018 – 2018-11Lebanon, UAEGovernment, AviationCisco Talos (2018-11-27) — end is the publication month

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 5

Resource Development2T1584.002DNS ServerT1588.004Digital Certificates
Execution1T1204.002Malicious File
Persistence1T1053.005Scheduled Task
Command and Control1T1071.004DNS

Malware and tools 2

NameDescriptionPlatform
DNSpionageRAT (HTTP / DNS tunnelling)Windows
KarkoffBackdoor (.NET)Windows

Infrastructure patterns

  • Fake job-posting sites (hr-wipro[.]com, hr-suncor[.]com) serving macro documents (Talos, 2018)
  • DNS redirection of .gov and private domains, with a Let's Encrypt cert per domain (Talos, 2018)

Reporting and advisories 3