ThreatNexus
Nation-state APT intelligence
Dossiers Open app
North KoreaAttributedDPRK 313 General BureauMixedActive 2023 – 2026

Contagious Interview

Also known asDEV#POPPER · Tenacious Pungsan · WaterPlum · PurpleBravo · DeceptiveDevelopment · Gwisin Gang · TAG-121 · Void Dokkaebi · UNC5342 · NICKEL ALLEY

Summary

North Korean group that poses as employers to infect software developers and IT professionals during fake job interviews — Japan's NPA, the FBI and four partner agencies call it WaterPlum, 'commonly referred to as Contagious Interview' (Sep 2026). Victims are told to run coding tests or fix a 'broken' video-call client from attacker repositories and npm packages carrying BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy or StoatWaffle, followed by RATs and wallet/credential stealers. From about December 2025 to July 2026 it infected at least 30,000 PCs in 100+ countries and took funds or credentials from over 7,000 crypto wallets, moving ¥1.7B (~$10.71M) to the DPRK. The NPA and FBI assess that it and some North Korean IT workers sit under the 313 General Bureau of the Munitions Industry Department, and some WaterPlum operators also work as IT workers. The remote-IT-worker revenue program itself is tracked separately here as Jasper Sleet; CrowdStrike's FAMOUS CHOLLIMA covers both. BSI (April 2026) lists the actor as active against German organisations.

Attribution

AttributedGovernment attribution: DPRK 313 General Bureau

Munitions Industry Department, WPK Central Committee

Named by a government: indictment, sanctions designation, joint advisory or official statement.

Sources

Campaigns 5

CampaignPeriodTargetsSectorsSource
Developer supply-chain spillover — poisoned npm, Go, Packagist, PyPI and extension packages2026-04 – 2026-09GlobalSoftware Development, TechnologyESET Research (2026-10-28) — as DeceptiveDevelopment (an alias on this record)
WaterPlum fake-employer coding interviews — 30,000+ PCs, 7,000+ wallets (six-agency advisory)2025-12 – 2026-07Japan, USA, Europe, GlobalSoftware Development, Cryptocurrency, Blockchain, Web3, Freelance ITNPA/FBI/DC3/ASD ACSC/BND/BfV joint advisory (2026-09-18)
Fake developer interviews — OtterCookie / JS beaconing agent / FlexibleFerret wave2025-10 – ongoingGlobalTechnology, MediaMicrosoft Defender Experts (2026-03-11)
Germany — financial-services targeting via fake job applicants / IT freelancers (BSI listing)2024 – 2026-04GermanyFinancial ServicesBSI 'Active APT groups in Germany' (2026-04-14)
Contagious Interview Global Campaign2023-11 – ongoingGlobalTechnology, CryptocurrencyUnit 42 (2023-11-21) / Mandiant

Newest first. ASSESSED: tied to the actor with hedging or through an alias. CLAIMED: an allegation no independent source confirms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques 13

Reconnaissance1T1681Search Threat Vendor Data
Initial Access1T1566.003Spearphishing via Service
Execution4T1204.002Malicious FileT1059.007JavaScriptT1059.006PythonT1204.005Malicious Library
Persistence2T1543.001Launch AgentT1547.013XDG Autostart Entries
Privilege Escalation1T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration Modification
Credential Access2T1555Credentials from Password StoresT1555.001Keychain
Exfiltration1T1020Automated Exfiltration
Impact1T1657Financial Theft

Malware and tools 10

NameDescriptionPlatform
BeaverTailJavaScript InfostealerCross-platform
InvisibleFerretPython BackdoorCross-platform
OtterCookiemacOS LoadermacOS
FERRETSTEALCredential/Wallet StealerCross-platform
FlexibleFerretModular backdoor (Go/Python)Cross-platform
XORIndex LoaderMalwareWindows
HexEval LoaderMalwareLinux/macOS/Windows
OtterCandyNode.js RAT/stealer combining OtterCookie and RATatouille featuresCross-platform
StoatWaffleModular Node.js loader, credential harvester and RAT delivered via auto-running VS Code project configsCross-platform
OmniStealerInfostealer (Python)windows/linux/macOS

Infrastructure patterns

  • Fake email, LinkedIn and code-repository accounts behind its recruiter personas (MITRE ATT&CK, 2026)
  • C&C IP read from Ethereum transactions (NullReceiver) — switched without a package update (ESET, 2026)
  • Lures on self-hosted Gitea; payloads on JSONBin.io, JSONHosting and Pinata IPFS (ESET, 2026)

Reporting and advisories 6